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DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): ONE-ON-ONE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING,
OCTOBER 21, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA XXX (SFO-GVA-VI-007)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 0920 (SFO-GVA-VI-009)
[1](#)C. STATE 107748 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-010.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: October 21, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S.	RUSSIA
A/S Gottemoeller	Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell	

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) On October 21, 2009, United States Head of Delegation (HOD) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller met with Russian HOD Ambassador Antonov at the Russian Mission. Antonov began to elaborate some new Russian positions regarding missile defense (MD), strategic offensive arms (SOAs) equipped with non-nuclear warheads, and numerical limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers. He appeared open to addressing MD in a separate document from the treaty as long as it was legally-binding. He also appeared open to permitting non-nuclear warheads on

strategic offensive delivery vehicles as long as both were accountable under the treaty. Antonov offered no flexibility on Russia's proposed limit of 600 deployed and non-deployed launchers. He continued to reject the concept of counting and inspecting heavy bomber nuclear armaments in storage. Tentative agreement was reached on the text of a joint statement recognizing the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, to be issued upon expiration of the START Treaty.

14. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russia's Need for Missile Defense Guarantees; Russian Concerns About Non-Nuclear SOA; Launcher Numbers and Deployment Status; Aversion to WSA Inspections; START Expiration Joint Statement and Ukraine; Heads-Up on Bridging Agreement.

RUSSIA'S NEED FOR MISSILE
DEFENSE GUARANTEES

15. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov began with a discussion of Russia's MD concerns. Referring to a U.S. suggestion made during lunch the previous day that a side agreement on MD might be developed (REF A), Antonov reiterated that Russia was not attempting to constrain either the numbers or locations of U.S. MD systems. Russia recognized that the treaty the Parties were working on to replace the START Treaty would cover only SOAs. However, given the fact that there was no longer an ABM Treaty, Russia required a written, legally-binding guarantee at the Presidential level of

certain commitments. These were:

- not to convert ICBM or SLBM launchers for use with MD interceptor missiles;
- not to convert MD interceptor launchers for use with ICBMs or SLBMs;
- not to give MD interceptor missiles the capabilities or characteristics of ICBMs or SLBMs;
- there would be verifiable differences.

He added that the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) could be tasked to agree on verifiable differences that ICBMs, SLBMs, and their launchers would have from MD interceptor missiles and launchers. These did not need to be functional differences. Transparency measures could be developed.

16. (S) Antonov said he was not yet ready to talk about the exact format of the agreement, but he referred to a piece of paper, which he said he had discussed with his lawyers. The agreement would have to be legally-binding, and would assure Russia that U.S. MD would not be used against Russia's strategic deterrent, at least for the lifetime of the new treaty. He commented that the "fourth phase" of U.S. MD development would only occur after the new treaty had gone out of force (ca. 2020) and, therefore, the issue could be dealt with in the future. By that time, he joked, he would be retired, and it would be someone else's headache. Although the United States had decided not to deploy the MD "third site," Antonov continued to see alarming articles in the press about various U.S. plans for MD elements in Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine. Without a legally-binding guarantee, Russian suspicions about the purpose of European MD systems would remain.

17. (S) Gottemoeller expressed the hope that, over time, not only would the United States reassure Russia about U.S. MD systems, but would begin joint MD programs with Russia. The United States would be prepared to develop a separate joint statement, but could not agree to include MD provisions in the START Follow-on Treaty itself. Antonov expressed confidence that agreement could be reached on the format.

The treaty itself would provide that there were no limitations on systems other than SOA, and would reflect the current level of MD. There could be a separate joint statement, which would not use treaty wording. He also stated that, although he was not yet ready to talk about it, nor was he ready to hand over the paper he had discussed with his lawyers, he was confident a compromise solution could be found to the proposal that Russia had made relating MDs to withdrawal from the treaty.

RUSSIAN CONCERNS
ABOUT NON-NUCLEAR SOA

¶8. (S) Antonov mused that the term "ban" with respect to non-nuclear SOA would sound negative to the U.S. Senate. He had noticed U.S. efforts in the negotiations not to constrain

possible future research and development. But failure to constrain non-nuclear SOA would cause commentators in Moscow to conclude that the new treaty facilitated actual U.S. employment of ICBMs and SLBMs. If U.S. strategic missiles were employed as non-nuclear weapons, Russian generals who lived through the Cold War would suspect that they would be launched with nuclear warheads the next time. This would become an increasing concern, even a serious irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. Nevertheless, there was not really time now to negotiate the ban on deployment of such weapons that Russia had been proposing.

¶9. (S) Antonov suggested that, instead of a ban, all U.S. non-nuclear warheads and their associated delivery vehicles would be accountable and would be considered nuclear for treaty purposes. Subsequent negotiations could determine how to resolve the specific issue of employment of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs. Gottemoeller acknowledged that such an approach would buy some time, noting that Russia was also developing non-nuclear SOAs. Antonov quipped that Russia always copied what the United States did.

LAUNCHER NUMBERS AND
DEPLOYMENT STATUS

¶10. (S) Gottemoeller asked for Antonov's thinking about numerical limits on launchers. Antonov said he had heard from his delegation what the United States discussed at the morning's Ad-Hoc Group Meeting (REF B). They perceived that the U.S. side could not live with fewer than 850 launchers. Russia's proposed number was 600 launchers, which was consistent with the structure of Russia's nuclear deterrent. It would be difficult for the Russian Delegation to accept a limit as high as 700 launchers; that would be criticized in Moscow. Gottemoeller noted the main problem was that the U.S. and Russian force structures differed. Antonov concluded that the Presidents would need to discuss numerical limits on November 15. (Begin comment: Antonov was referring to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit scheduled for November 15-16 in Singapore. End comment.)

¶11. (S) Antonov complained that the U.S. concept for when systems would be considered deployed and non-deployed was unrealistic and inconsistent. After Russia finally agreed to count the number of warheads actually deployed, the United States wanted to consider launchers deployed even when they were not carrying missiles, and to count warheads that were not loaded on heavy bombers. Gottemoeller acknowledged the contradiction with the "considered to contain" concept in the U.S. proposal, but reminded Antonov about the difficulty of constantly notifying changes every time a missile was placed in or removed from a deployed launcher.

AVERSION TO WSA INSPECTIONS

¶12. (S) Gottemoeller inquired whether Russia was willing to count and permit inspections of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in storage. Antonov had nothing good to say about

this U.S. proposal. The storage facilities on both sides contained many other items besides the items subject to inspection. The other items were sensitive and would have to be concealed, which would only result in each side suspecting the other of cheating. It would also be too easy to remove ALCMs or bombs to another facility before inspectors arrived, and return them after inspectors departed. The sides would gain nothing from these types of inspections. The START experience with these types of inspections had been "very bad."

¶13. (S) In response to Gottemoeller's prediction that the next treaty would cover all warheads in storage, Antonov acknowledged that warhead transparency and tactical nuclear weapons might be topics for future negotiations, but it was not possible to address that at this stage. There was still too much suspicion between the sides, and there was not enough time to negotiate access to warheads in the START Follow-on Treaty. Gottemoeller reiterated the importance of building a foundation for future negotiations. It was necessary to begin a process of inspecting ALCMs in storage so as to build such a foundation. Antonov countered that negotiations conducted with frankness and understanding of the other side's concerns would build a sufficient foundation for the future. Implementing the new treaty would also build trust.

¶14. (S) Gottemoeller continued to press. RosAtom had been accepting U.S. observation at its fissile material storage facilities for many years, so why was it impossible for the Ministry of Defense? The United States was not asking for access into actual warhead facilities, only to the ALCM storage facilities associated with air bases. Antonov confessed he did not know the technical reason. But the Russian Delegation could not identify any benefit to their side.

START EXPIRATION JOINT
STATEMENT AND UKRAINE

¶15. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov went through Russia's edits to the U.S.-proposed text of a joint statement by Russia and the United States on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in connection with the expiration of START (REF C, Paragraphs 12-18). They reached agreement on the wording of the text. Gottemoeller undertook to provide a clean copy (text follows below) that the sides could confirm was agreed "ad-referendum." Antonov promised to provide the text in Russian translation and to send the document to Moscow for approval.

Begin text (Version of the Joint Statement agreed ad-referendum, provided the following day):

U.S.-Proposed
Joint Draft Text
October 22, 2009

JOINT STATEMENT

by the United States of America and the Russian Federation
in Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty

on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Russian Federation recognize the significant contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to successful implementation of the Treaty Between the United

States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(START Treaty).

The value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced when the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine removed all nuclear weapons from their territories and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states. The actions of these states have enhanced the NPT regime, had a beneficial impact on international security and strategic stability, and created favorable conditions for further steps to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation welcome the commitment of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to their status as non-nuclear weapon states. The fulfillment by these states of their obligations under the Protocol to the START Treaty of May 23, 1992 (Lisbon Protocol) and their accession to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, strengthened their security, which was reflected, inter alia, in the Budapest Memoranda of December 5, 1994. In this connection, the United States of America and the Russian Federation confirm that the assurances recorded in the Budapest Memoranda will remain in force after December 4, 2009.

End text.

¶16. (S) Antonov informed Gottemoeller that Ukrainian JCIC Representative Nykonenko had called him and was coming to Geneva on October 30. He planned to meet with Nykonenko and asked whether Gottemoeller also would do so. At the same time, Antonov considered that the Ukrainians were trying to play Russia and the United States off against each other. Antonov had not provided the draft joint statement to any other Party, although all had asked to see it. He and Gottemoeller agreed it was not yet time to provide the text, and that they should not accept comments on it from Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine. They would decide later when the joint statement should be initialed and by what level officials.

¶17. (S) Antonov added that Ukraine was always talking about security assurances. Russia believed this issue should be addressed in the NPT context, since it would affect P-5 relations with the other non-nuclear weapons states if they gave special security guarantees to certain states. The United States and Russia should work together on this, and with Ukraine. However, Antonov said he had not found willingness on the U.S. side to engage.

HEADS-UP ON BRIDGING AGREEMENT

¶18. (S) Antonov revealed he had received a message from

Ambassador Kislyak in Washington after Kislyak's meeting the previous week with Under Secretary of State Tauscher. Kislyak had conveyed to Antonov that the United States was developing an option for the U.S. and Russian Presidents to agree on a legally-binding framework agreement by December 5, and that the U.S. proposed discussing such an agreement during the Summit. Antonov complained that completing such an interim document and obtaining its ratification by the Duma would require Russia to halt the negotiations on START Follow-on.

¶19. (S) Gottemoeller said she would check with U/S Tauscher, but she believed there was a misunderstanding. The United States was not planning for a framework agreement. The United States was looking at a possible bridging arrangement to provide for the continuation of notifications, transparency, and data exchanges during the period between the expiration of START and entry into force of the new treaty. She promised to discuss the U.S. ideas at a later

date, but emphasized the need to continue focusing on the new treaty. Her instructions were to finish the treaty by December 5.

¶20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text: "Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," (Agreed ad referendum and provided the following day, October 22, 2009.)

¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS